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LEGISLATION NOTES

LEGISLATIVE VETO IN OHIO: THE "TWILIGHT
ZONE OF DISTINCTION"9*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The history of government in the United States is one of expansion
into multifarious bureaucracies. 1 At both state and federal levels, the
authority of administrative agencies to effectively "make" law by
promulgating specific rules pursuant to general statutes has increased
dramatically in the last fifty years.2 A growing population and burgeoning technology have contributed to this phenomenon by reducing
the ability of legislatures to pass specific statutes that are directly applicable to the populace. 3 Rather, broad statutes have come to be enacted which authorize agencies to "fill in the details" requiring administrative or technical expertise."
At the federal level, as Congress increased the quasi-legislative authority of administrative agencies, the resulting shift of political power
did not escape notice. As a check on the authority of agencies, Congress at times retained the authority to veto particular agency rules or
actions by including a legislative review provision in the very statute
authorizing the agency to act.5 Either one or both houses of Congress
could later review particular agency rules or actions and veto by resolution those found to be objectionable." As the bureaucracy grew, the
number of individual laws with "built-in" legislative review and invalidation procedures also increased.

* Bogen v. Clemmer, 125 Ohio St. 186, 189, 180 N.E. 710, 711 (1932).
I. See generally Berle, The Expansion of American Administrative Law, 30 HARV. L. REv.
430 (1917); Foster, The Delegation of Legislative Power to Administrative Officers, 7 ILL. L.
REV. 397 (1913).
2. See Pierce & Shapiro, Politicaland Judicial Review of Agency Action, 59 TEX. L. REV.
1175, 1179 (1981).
3. Friendly, The FederalAdministrative Agencies: The Need for Better Definition of Standards, 75 HARV. L. REV. 1263, 1308-10 (1962); Stone, The Twentieth Century Administrative
Explosion and after, 52 CALIF. L. REV. 513, 520 (1964).
4. Pierce & Shapiro, supra note 2, at 1197-98.
5. For a historical review of the development of extralegislative congressional power from
the turn of the century, see Watson, Congress Steps Out: A Look at Congressional Control of the
Executive, 63 CALIF. L. REV. 983 (1975).
6. Id.
7. See B. CRAIG, THE LEGISLATIVE VETO 26-38 (1983). The United States Department of
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From its inception, the constitutionality of this method of legislative review and invalidation has been challenged 8 and defended. 9 The
prevailing view1" assumes that the Constitution requires Congress to
enact statutes sufficiently specific for agency application, and that an
agency exceeds its constitutional function if a substantive interpretation
is supplied. In applying the law, however, an agency may promulgate
"subordinate" rules having the full force and effect of
law, but may not
modify its enabling statute. The check on agency excess in promulgating subordinate rules is the authority of the judiciary to interpret the
enabling statute and adjudge the validity of an agency action under the
statute, when a justiciable question is presented.
When Congress invalidates an agency rule, critical constitutional
issues are raised. Functionally speaking, a legislative invalidation of an
agency rule constitutes an amendment to the agency's enabling statute.
That is, the power to destroy the agency-supplied "details" having the
full force of law is arguably tantamount to repealing or amending the
original statute authorizing the agency to act. The Constitution, however, permits Congress to amend existing laws only by enacting amending statutes. In so acting, the constitutional mandates are clear; certain
procedures must be followed. To enact a statute, Congress must first
"present" the proposed law to the Executive for a possible
veto. Since
invalidation of an agency rule by resolution effectively bypasses the Executive, the presentment requirement has been violated. Thus, under
this theory, the constitutional authority of the Executive to veto proposed laws has been usurped, upsetting the separation of governmental
powers.
The United States Supreme Court has recently adopted this analysis, holding that Congress cannot constitutionally invalidate agency
rules or actions11 except by statute. This decision of the Court calls into
Justice has compiled a list of over 300 federal laws that contain legislative veto provisions. Statement of Edward C. Schmults, deputy attorney general, Department of Justice, Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. app. A (1983) (on file with University of Dayton Law Review).
8. See generally Bruff & Gellhorn, CongressionalControl of Administrative Regulation: A
Study of Legislative Vetoes, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1369 (1977); Dixon, The Congressional Veto and
Separation of Powers: The Executive on a Leash?, 56 N.C.L. REV. 423 (1978); Ginnane,
The
Control of Federal Administration by CongressionalResolutions and Committees, 66 HARV.
L.
REV. 569 (1953).
9. See generally Abourezk, The Congressional Veto: A Contemporary Response to Executive Encroachment on Legislative Prerogatives, 52 IND. L.J. 323 (1977); Cooper & Cooper, The
Legislative Veto and the Constitution,30 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 467 (1962); Javits & Klein, Congressional Oversight and the Legislative Veto: A ConstitutionalAnalysis, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV.
455
(1977).
10. See infra notes 148-71 and accompanying text.
II. Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983), afl'g 634 F.2d
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol9/iss3/11
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question a host of federal laws with built-in invalidation procedures,1 2
and its full effect is yet to be determined by experience and succeeding
cases. These profound questions of federal law are, however, beyond
the pale of this discussion.
This note will focus upon the constitutionality of legislative review
and invalidation at the state level-specifically, in Ohio. The Ohio Legislature has enacted a single statute authorizing the invalidation of any
proposed agency rule (within the statute), 3 rather than attaching review and invalidation procedures to individual enabling statutes, as
Congress had done under the federal system of legislative veto recently
found unconstitutional. The Ohio system authorizes a legislative review
committee to analyze proposed agency rules and recommend invalidation of objectionable rules to the full legislature." The legislature may
then act to invalidate a recommended rule by joint resolution.1 5
The importance of the Supreme Court's finding legislative review
and invalidation violative of the Federal Constitution is by analogy
only. The Court's decisions do not directly control state law. Yet by
attempting to resolve the constitutionality of legislative review of
agency rules, the Court has provided the first definitive federal answer
to the question, and an important model for state analysis.
The constitutionality of legislative review and invalidation of
agency rules in Ohio must be determined by examining the function
and effect of the review and invalidation procedure in light of the Ohio
Constitution. This note details the practical effect of the Ohio review
and invalidation procedure, examines the recent decisions of other state
courts finding similar procedures unconstitutional, and applies the Ohio
Constitution as interpreted by the Ohio Supreme Court. For the purposes of this note, since the Ohio and Federal Constitutions have analogous provisions requiring the presentment of all bills to the executive
for a possible veto," the analysis of the Supreme Court in finding legislative review and invalidation unconstitutional at the federal level will
be considered apposite to the constitutional questions raised by Ohio
legislative veto law under the Ohio Constitution.

408 (9th Cir. 1980). See also Consumer Energy Council of Am. v. Federal Energy Regulatory
Comm'n, 673 F.2d 425 (D.C. Cir. 1982), affd mem., 103 S. Ct. 3556 (1983).
12. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. at 2811-16.
13. See infra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
15.

See infra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 43-58 and accompanying text.

16.

Compare U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cls. 2-3 with OHIO CONST. art. II, § 15(E).

14.
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THE PROMULGATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE RULES UNDER THE

APA
As enacted, the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)1 7 applied
only to agencies accorded licensing authority. 18 It provided a uniform
procedure for the adoption, amendment, or rescission of agency rules,
required the agencies to hold public hearings before any rulemaking
decision was made, and established a system for the appeal of an
agency rulemaking decision.' 9 Specifically, the APA conferred upon the
judiciary jurisdiction to hear the appeal of anyone adversely affected by
an agency rulemaking decision, and provided for judicial invalidation of
agency rules which had not been promulgated in conformance with the
statutory procedure." In substance, the APA was a legislative response
intended to constrain and regulate the ever-expanding state bureaucracy. To this end, it came to include not only those agencies with licensing authority, but also any agency promulgating rules which had a
"general and uniform operation."'"
The history of the APA bespeaks a legislative purpose to increase
the awareness of individuals subject to agency rules by providing such
individuals the means to challenge agency rulemaking decisions. 2 This
purpose is displayed not only in the public hearing and judicial appeal
provisions of the original APA, but also in subsequent amendments.
The APA remained relatively unchanged until 1976, when existing and
future agency rules were required to be codified and published. A further revision required agencies to make available public notice of the
hearing to be conducted on any proposed rule change. 24
By conferring upon the judiciary jurisdiction to hear individual appeals of agency rulemaking decisions, it is clear that the legislature
viewed judicial review as the appropriate check on bureaucratic excess.
This is evidenced by two separate APA provisions--one providing for a
judicial appeal of agency rulemaking decisions,25 or "quasi-legislative"

17. 1943 Ohio Laws 358 (codified as amended at OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 119.01-.12
(Page Supp. 1982)).
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 359.

21.

Id. at 358-59. Subsequently, the APA has been expanded to include all the agencies

currently listed or defined under OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 119.01 (Page Supp. 1982).
22. See generally Note, A Survey of the Ohio Administrative Procedures Act, 22 CLEV. ST.
L. REV. 320 (1973).

23.

Act of June 11, 1976, 1976 Ohio Legis. Serv. 4-445, 4-445 (Baldwin) (codified as

amended at OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 103.05 (Page Supp. 1982)).
24. Act of June 2, 1977, 1977 Ohio Legis. Serv. 5-62 (Baldwin) (codified as amended at
OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 119.03(A) (Page Supp. 1982)).
25. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 119.11 (Page 1978), repealed by Act of June 11, 1976, 1976
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agency actions, and one providing for a judicial appeal of agency adju-

7
dicatory proceedings 2 6 or "quasi-judicial" agency actions.2 But the
Supreme Court of Ohio significantly altered this statutory grant of uni-

versal rule appeal by finding that judicial review of agency rulemaking
28
decisions contravened the Ohio Constitution. The court ruled in 1975
that since the Ohio Constitution granted to the judiciary jurisdiction
29
only over "proceedings of administrative offices," the statutory grant
of jurisdiction to hear appeals concerning the promulgation of rules was
0
outside the scope of the constitutional authority of the judiciary."
Thus, the court drew a distinction between the promulgation of agency
rules and the application of agency rules through quasi-judicial proceedings.31 The court has advised in succeeding cases, however, that a
judicial appeal of agency rulemaking decisions may still be obtained in
an action for declaratory judgment, provided that the parties 2are able

to present a justiciable question in an adversarial proceeding.8

Ohio Legis. Serv. 4-445 (Baldwin). Section 119.11 provided in pertinent part:
Any person adversely affected by an order of an agency in adopting, amending, or rescinding a rule or in adopting, readopting, or continuing a rule, amendment, or rescission
previously adopted as an emergency rule as provided in Section 119.03 of the Revised
Code, may appeal to the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County on the ground that
said agency failed to comply with the law in adopting, amending, rescinding, publishing, or
distributing said rule, or that the rule as adopted or amended by the agency is unreasonable or unlawful, or that the rescission of the rule was unreasonable or unlawful.
26. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 119.12 (Page Supp. 1982).
27. The "quasi-legislative" function of an administrative agency constitutes rulemaking, but
does not contemplate enforcement of rules. The "quasi-judicial" function constitutes the enforcement of rules by an adjudicatory proceeding, such as a tax court decision. As noted by Justice
Jackson, the distinction is largely illusory:
Administrative agencies have been called quasi-legislative, quasi-executive or quasi-judicial, as the occasion required, in order to validate their functions within the separation-ofpowers scheme of the Constitution. The mere retreat to the qualifying "quasi" is implicit
with confession that all recognized classifications have broken down, and "quasi" is a
smooth cover which we draw over our confusion as we might use a counterpane to conceal
a disorded bed.
FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 487-88 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting). See generally Comment, Limiting the Legislative Veto: Chadha v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 81
COLUM. L. REV. 1721, 1731 (1981).
28. Rankin-Thoman, Inc. v. Caldwell, 42 Ohio St. 2d 436, 329 N.E.2d 686 (1975). The
Rankin-Thoman decision is the culmination of a line of cases in which the Ohio Supreme Court
refused to review the "reasonableness" of agency rulemaking decisions because a justiciable question had not been presented by adversarial parties. See DeLong v. Board of Educ., 36 Ohio St. 2d
62, 303 N.E.2d 890 (1973); Burger Brewing Co. v. Liquor Control Comm'n, 34 Ohio St. 2d 93,
296 N.E.2d 261 (1973); M.J. Kelley Co. v. City of Cleveland, 32 Ohio St. 2d 150, 290 N.E.2d
562 (1972); Fortner v. Thomas, 22 Ohio St. 2d 13, 257 N.E.2d 371 (1970); Zangerle v. Evatt,
139 Ohio St. 563, 41 N.E.2d 369 (1942).
29. OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 4(B) (emphasis added).
30. Rankin-Thoman, 42 Ohio St. 2d at 439, 329 N.E.2d at 688.
31. Id. at 438, 329 N.E.2d at 688.
32. Williams v. City of Akron, 54 Ohio St. 2d 136, 374 N.E.2d 1378 (1978); Burger Brewing Co., 42 Ohio St. 2d 377, 329 N.E.2d 693 (1975).
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It is not surprising that this judicial abrogation of the statutory
appeal procedure sparked a legislative concern that agency rulemaking
decisions would be subject to no limiting authority. In response to this
perceived need, the Ohio General Assembly passed the original H. 257
in 1975, the state's first legislative veto provision. 3
A.

The Original H. 257

House Bill 257 was designed to shift the review of agency
rulemaking decisions to the legislature by creating a legislative review
committee 'and by empowering the general assembly to invalidate
agency rules recommended by the review committee by passing a joint
resolution. 4 The bill authorized the general assembly to invalidate
agency rules having the "full force and effect" of law 35 without following the formal lawmaking procedure required by the Ohio Constitution
to pass a statute. 36 Invalidation through joint resolution required only
that both houses of the legislature concur in the invalidation.3 7
For this reason the original H. 257 was vetoed by the governor.38
The governor's principal objection was that H. 257 would "obliterate"
the "historical" distinction between the administrative function of the
executive (acting through administrative agencies) and the lawmaking
function of the legislature. 9 Such an obfuscation of executive and legislative functions, argued the governor, would cause citizens interested
in the adoption or amendment of a particular agency rule to be subjected to two complete hearing procedures."' The governor considered
the most "onerous" aspect of the bill to be the provision authorizing the

33. H. 257, 11 lth Ohio General Assembly, 1st Reg. Sess., 136 OHIO HOUSE J. 217 (1975).
The bill passed with overwhelming support in both the house (86 to 1) and senate (24 to 7).
136
OHIO HOUSE J. 670 (1975).
34. H. 257, 111 th Ohio General Assembly, 1st Reg. Sess., construed in OHIO LEGISLATIVE
SERV. COMM'N, SUMMARY OF 1975 ENACTMENTS 215-16 [hereinafter cited as SUMMARY
OF 1975
ENACTMENTS].

35. Rules promulgated by an administrative agency pursuant to statutory authority have
the force and effect of law and constitute a part of the law of the state. State ex rel.
Miller
Plumbing Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 149 Ohio St. 493, 79 N.E.2d 553 (1948); Kroger Grocery
&
Baking Co. v. Glander, 149 Ohio St. 120, 77 N.E.2d 921 (1948); State ex rel. Kildow v. Industrial Comm'n, 128 Ohio St. 573, 192 N.E. 873 (1934).
36. Construed in SUMMARY OF 1975 ENACTMENTS, supra note 34, at 215-16. See also OHIO
CONST. art. 11, § 15(E).
37. Construed in SUMMARY OF 1975 ENACTMENTS, supra note 34, at 215-16. See also OHIO
CONST. art. 11, § 15(A), (E). The legislature cannot constitutionally amend or
repeal a law by
joint resolution. A joint resolution is not a legislative "act." Cleveland Terminal & Valley
R.R. v.
State, 85 Ohio St. 351, 97 N.E. 967 (1912); State ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. Kinney, 56 Ohio
St.
721, 47 N.E. 569 (1897).
38. Governor's Veto Message, 136 OHIo HOUSE J. 2042 (Nov. 12, 1975).
39. Id. at 2042-43.
40. Id.
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legislature to invalidate not only 'proposed agency rules, but also rules
that were currently in effect. 4' Suggesting that such a task was beyond
the "constitutional purpose" of the legislature, the governor concluded
already possessed were adequate
that the means which the legislature
42
rulemaking.
agency
to control
B.

The Enactment of H. 257

House Bill 257 was reintroduced in the general assembly in
1977.4 3 Most notably, the bill had been revised to apply only to proposed agency rules." The bill passed with overwhelming support in
4
went unsigned by the governor for
both the house 4 5 and the senate,"
4 7 and became effective on October 10,
period,
ten-day
the requisite
1977.48

The stated purpose of H. 257 was "to give the General Assembly
more control over the substance of rules adopted by the administrative
agencies." ' 49 The bill created the Joint Committee on Agency Rule Review (Joint Committee) and provided that the committee would have
the same powers as other legislative committees," including the power
to subpoena and place witnesses under oath.6
41. Id. at 2045.
42. Id.
43. H. 257, 112th Ohio General Assembly, 1st Reg. Sess., 138 OHIO HOUSE J. 185 (1977).
44. Act of July 29, 1977, 1977 Ohio Legis. Serv. 5-111, 5-111 (Baldwin) (codified as
amended at OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 111.15(B)(l)-(6) (Page Supp. 1982)). In vetoing the original H. 257, the governor had strongly objected to the provision allowing the legislature to invalidate existing agency rules. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
45. 138 OHIo HOUSE J. 449 (1977).
46. Id. at 686.
47. OHIO CONST. art. 11, § 16.
48. 1977 Ohio Legis. Serv. 5-111 (Baldwin).
49. OHIO LEGISLATIVE SERV. COMM'N, BILL ANALYSIS: SUB. H. B. 257 (As REPORTED BY
S. WAYS AND MEANS) 1 (1977) (on file with University of Dayton Law Review).
50. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 101.35 (Page Supp. 1982).
51. See id. § 101.41 (committee authority to subpoena witnesses); id. § 101.46 (committee
authority to place witnesses under oath).
The Joint Committee was to be composed of seven members of the house and seven members
of the senate, with the members to be appointed by the speaker of the house and president pro
tempore of the senate, respectively. Id. § 101.35 (Page 1978). The size of the Joint Committee
was reduced to ten members in 1978. Id. § 101.35 (Page Supp. 1982). Not more than four members of either house could be members of the same political party. Id. § 101.35 (Page 1978). The
number of members of the same political party was reduced in 1978 to three members respectively. Id. § 101.35 (Page Supp. 1982). Additionally, the bill provided that eight members were
required to constitute a quorum, and that the concurrence of eight members was required to
recommend the invalidation of an agency rule. Id. § 101.35 (Page 1978). The number of members
required to constitute a quorum was reduced in 1978 to six. Id. § 101.35 (Page Supp. 1982).
As enacted, H. 257 specifically exempted from legislative review emergency rules, id. §
101.35 (Page Supp. 1982); actions of the Industrial Commission or Bureau of Workers' Compensation regarding matters of adjudication, id.; temporary rules, id. § 119.01(J); rules other than

Published by eCommons, 1983

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 9:3

House Bill 257 authorized the Joint Committee to recommend to
the general assembly the passage of a joint resolution invalidating any
proposed rule if it found:
(1) That the rule-making agency has exceeded the scope of its
statutory authority in proposing the rule, amendment, or rescission;
(2) That the proposed rule, amendment, or rescission conflicts with
another rule, amendment, or rescission adopted by the same or a different rule-making agency;
(3) That the proposed rule, amendment, or rescission conflicts with
the legislative intent in enacting the statute under which the rule-making
agency proposed the rule, amendment, or rescission.5 2
Upon the recommendation of the Joint Committee, the general assembly was authorized to invalidate a rule in whole or in part, in which
case the general assembly would have to specify why the rule was being
invalidated.5 3 If the general assembly invalidated a rule by joint resolution, the rulemaking agency was prohibited from proposing the same
rule for the duration of the invalidating general assembly, unless specifically authorized to do so by an additional joint resolution. 4 If the general assembly did not invalidate a rule within sixty days of its proposal,
the agency was authorized to adopt the rule.5 5 Notwithstanding a legislative invalidation, however, an agency could not further revise a rule
after this sixty-day period for invalidation had expired, and was forced
to adopt the rule in its proposed form.56
It is important to note that H. 257 included a clause providing
that the failure of the general assembly to invalidate a rule was not to
those proposed by an administrative agency of the state, id. § 119.01(A); internal management
rules, id. § 119.01(C); and rules proposed by the Ohio Student Loan Commission promulgated
pursuant to federal law, id. § 111.15(D)(6).
There are two statutory provisions defining "emergency rules" that are exempt from legislative review. An agency rule filed under § I 11.15(B) must be necessary for the "immediate preservation of the public peace, health, or safety," and becomes effective immediately upon being
filed.
Id. § 111.15(B). There is currently a bill pending in the senate which would place a
90-day
limitation from legislative review on such a rule. H. 244, 115th Ohio General Assembly, 1st
Reg.
Sess. (1983). Under § 119.03(F) the governor must determine that an "emergency requires
the
immediate adoption, amendment, or rescission of a rule." When adopted, such a rule becomes
effective immediately but is automatically invalidated after 90 days unless the submitting agency
has filed the rule for legislative review. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 119.03(F) (Page Supp.
1982).
A "temporary" rule is defined as one intended to expire in less than twelve months. Id. §
119.01(J). The general assembly and state courts are not considered "state agencies" and do
not
file rules for legislative review. Id. § 119.01(A). "Internal management" rules are defined as rules
which do not affect private rights. Id. § 119.01(C).
52. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 119.03()(I)-(3) (Page Supp. 1982).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. § 119.03(D).
56. Id. § 119.03(1).
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be construed as a ratification of the lawfulness or reasonableness of the
rule, or as a ratification of the procedure under which the rule had been
adopted. 7 By this clause the legislature preserved the APA statutory
review procedure of agency actions by nullifying any possible stare decisis effect of the legislative review process. In this way the legislature
added to the APA the legislative review and invalidation procedure
without substantially modifying the prior judicial review procedures expressed or implicit in the APA."
III.

OPERATION OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE

A. 1978-1979
In 1978 the Joint Committee met seventeen times to review some
59
1,567 rules submitted by forty-three rulemaking agencies. The committee made no recommendations to the general assembly for invalidation during 1978, apparently due to the willingness of the rulemaking
agencies to revise proposed rules upon the suggestion of the Joint
Committee. 0
Assisting the fourteen committee members reviewing rules were a
6
staff coordinator and two staff persons. According to the 1978 Joint
Committee Report, some of the rules were revised or withdrawn as a
result of an informal meeting between the staff coordinator and a rep62
resentative of the rule-proposing agency. Other rules were revised or
withdrawn due to an objection by the sponsor of a recent law which
63
had prompted the promulgation of the rules. It is unclear from the
Staff Report to what extent the committee members participated in
this informal revision process.
4
The 1979 Staff Report 6 sheds more light upon the informal procedure by which the Joint Committee persuades rulemaking agencies to
revise or withdraw rules found to be objectionable. According to the
Report, rules are often objected to on an initial staff screening of the
5
rules for clerical errors or vague provisions. If such a problem is identified, the rulemaking agency is contacted within five days of the initial

57.
58.
59.
ter cited
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
ter cited
65.

Id.
See supra notes 25-32 and accompanying text.

1978, at 3 [hereinafReview).
Law
Dayton
of
University
with
19781 (on file

JOINT COMMITTEE ON AGENCY RULE REVIEW, ANNUAL REPORT

as ANNUAL
Id.
Id. at 2.
id.at 3.
Id.

REPORT

1979 [hereinafReview).
Law
Dayton
of
University
with
file
(on
1979]

REVIEW
STAFF REPORT FOR THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON AGENCY RULE

as

STAFF REPORT

Id. at 9.
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filing date." If the rulemaking agency refuses to revise the rule to correct the problem identified by the staff, a formal meeting is scheduled
with the committee members.67 The committee attempts to persuade
the rulemaking agency to revise its proposed rule until the sixty-day
time limit for invalidation has almost elapsed. 8
If the agency persists in its reluctance to revise or withdraw the
proposed rule, a final meeting is scheduled at which time the agency is
presented with the text of a previously prepared joint resolution to invalidate the rule, and assured that the joint resolution will be introduced to the general assembly in due course. 9 Eight such recommendations were prepared in 1979, causing all of the proposed rules to be
withdrawn except two rules proposed by the Ohio Department of Pub70
lic Welfare.
B.

1980-1981

In 1979 the Joint Committee met nineteen times to review 2,134
rules proposed by fifty rulemaking agencies.7 1 In 1980 it met fourteen
times to review 2,740 rules proposed by fifty-five agencies 2 and in 1981
it met twelve times to review 2,404 rules proposed by seventy-four separate agencies. 73 These years show a marked increase from the 1,651
rules which had been reviewed in the first year of the committee's existence, 74 reflecting a continuing increase in the authority of the committee to reach a broad spectrum of agency rules.
Of the 2,740 rules filed in 1980, 368 were considered to be "problem rules" and were considered in-depth at a formal committee meeting.h All of these rules were either revised or withdrawn under the
threat of a committee recommendation for invalidation. 6 The large
number of rules revised or withdrawn due to pressure from the Joint
Committee demonstrates the ability of the committee to manipulate the
rulemaking process
by threatening
a recommendation
for
77
invalidation.

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id.
Id. at 9-10.
Id. at 10.
Id.
Id.

71.
72.

STAFF REPORT 1979, supra note 64, at 3.
STAFF REPORT FOR THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON AGENCY RULE REVIEW 1980,
at 5 [hereinafter cited as STAFF REPORT 19801 (on file with University of Dayton Law Review).
73. STAFF REPORT FOR THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON AGENCY RULE REVIEW 1981,

at 5 [hereinafter cited as STAFF REPORT 1981] (on file with University of Dayton Law Review).
74. ANNUAL REPORT 1978, supra note 59.
75. STAFF REPORT 1980, supra note 72, at 9.
76. Id. at 9-12.
77. The Joint Committee found it necessary to prepare only four recommendations for
in-
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The degree of political persuasion exerted by the Joint Committee
is directly proportional to the legislature's Willingness to accept the
committee's recommendation for invalidation. The greater the likelihood that a recommendation will result in a joint resolution, the greater
the likelihood that the rule will be withdrawn prior to any legislative
action. 8 For example, of the 2,404 rules reviewed by the Joint Committee in 1981, twenty-two were recommended for a legislative invalidation.7 9 Of the twenty-two recommendations for invalidation, sixteen
Were withdrawn prior to action in either house of the general assembly;
five were approved for invalidation by the house but were withdrawn
before any action could be taken in the senate; and one rule was
invalidated. 0
The potency of a threatened recommendation for invalidation is
further illustrated by the large number of rules that were either withdrawn or revised prior to the committee carrying out the threat. In this
regard, approximately 125 of the 160 total rules that were withdrawn
in 1981 were withdrawn for the express purpose of avoiding a committee recommendation for invalidation." Of the total 502 rules which
were revised or refiled, 413 were so revised or refiled to avoid a
recommendation.8 2
The only rule invalidated in 1981 was a proposed rule filed by the
8
Ohio Department of Insurance. The invalidation of this rule highlights the ability of the legislature to effectively amend existing law by
finding that a rule is not within the purview of the legislative intent in
84
passing the enabling statute. The danger in this type of amendment is
validation in 1980. Three of the four proposed rules were either withdrawn or revised. One proposed rule became effective because the previously prepared joint resolution recommendation was
not concurred in by a quorum of the Joint Committee. Id. at 5.
78. The total number of rules withdrawn, revised, or refiled under a direct threat of a Joint
Committee recommendation for invalidation was 538, while the number of rules withdrawn after
a recommendation had been made but before the general assembly could act was 21, and the
number of rules actually invalidated by the general assembly was only one. STAFF REPORT 1981,
supra note 73, at 10-13.
79. Id. at 10.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 13.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 10.
84. See supra text accompanying note 52. The stated purpose of the invalidated rule was to
of the
establish a schedule of prima facie rates which would be acceptable to the superintendent
Ohio Department of Insurance. Proposed Amendment to OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 3901-1-14 (1981)
(on file with University of Dayton Law Review). Consistent with this purpose, the rule (covering
over forty pages) set out a detailed pay-rate schedule effectively giving notice to credit-life insurby
ance companies of the premium rates that would fall within the range deemed to be acceptable
which
the superintendent. Id. The invalidated rule had been promulgated pursuant to a statute
insurers
authorizes the superintendent to review premium-rate schedules submitted by individual
issuing credit-life insurance. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3918.07(B) (Page Supp. 1982). According
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that agency rulemaking could become a vehicle by which amending
legislation is passed in avoidance of the constitutional requirement that
all laws be submitted to the governor for a possible veto prior to

enactment.8 5
C.

1982

In 1982 the number of rules reviewed by the Joint Committee, and
consequently the number of recommended invalidations, increased dramatically. The committee met sixteen times to review 3,456 rules proposed by sixty-seven rulemaking agencies.8" Of the 3,456 rules filed,
2,509 were filed as "original" rules, 947 as "revised" or "refiled" rules,
and 197 rules were withdrawn. 87 Of the 947 revised or refiled rules,
approximately 710 were revised or refiled under an immediate committee threat of an invalidation recommendation; of the 197 withdrawn
rules, approximately 157 were withdrawn likewise to avoid such a
recommendation. 88
The Joint Committee. recommended to the legislature that it invalidate forty-four proposed89 rules, double the number that had been recommended for invalidation in 1981.90 Of the forty-four rules recommended for invalidation, twenty were withdrawn and sixteen were
refiled before-the legislature could take action to invalidate the rules.9
Four rules were invalidated by the senate but were not acted upon by
the house within the sixty-day statutory time limit for invalidation, and
thus became effective.92 Four rules were invalidated. 93
The first agency rule94 invalidated in 1982 had been proposed by
to the enabling statute, the superintendent had authority to "disapprove"
any rate schedule appearing "by reasonable assumption to be excessive in relation to benefits, or
if it contains provisions which are unjust, unfair, inequitable, misleading, deceptive, or encourage
misrepresentation
of the coverage... "Id. The broad language of the statute seems to indicate
that through its
enactment the legislature intended to provide the superintendent with discretion
in disapproving
submitted pay-rate schedules. By employing such broad criteria under which
the superintendent
could disapprove a submitted pay-rate schedule, it seems that the legislature
could not but have
considered such a decision to be a matter within the peculiar knowledge
of the superintendent.
The invalidation of these rules, therefore, tends to contradict rather than
preserve legislative
intent.
85. See supra text accompanying notes 8, 11.
86. STAFF REPORT FOR THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON AGENCY RULE REVIEW
1982, at 7 [hereinafter cited as STAFF REPORT 1982] (on file with University of Dayton Law
Review).
87. Id. at 12.
88. Id. at 15.
89. Id. at 12-15.
90. STAFF REPORT 1981, supra note 73, at 10.
91. STAFF REPORT 1982, supra note 86, at 12.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Proposed Amendment to OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 5101:2-31-07 (1982)
(on file with University of Dayton Law Review).
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the Department of Public Welfare pursuant to the enactment of H.
694. 96 The invalidation of this rule is a good example of the precision
with which the Joint Committee and the legislature may excise an offending portion of a rule, while providing that the rule thus amended
96
passes legislative review and becomes effective. This procedure prevents an agency from attaching a questionable provision to an otherwise acceptable rule, thereby circumventing legislative review by preying upon the legislature's unwillingness to invalidate an entire rule for
the duration of the session (up to two years) in order to correct a single
offending provision.
Thus, upon the recommendation of the Joint Committee, the general assembly excised a particular provision of a proposed rule and approved the remainder of the rule. Springing from this precise legislative
control is the ability to effectively legislate through the rule-review process in areas where the enabling statute has accorded the agency a degree of discretion.97 Such revisionary control allows the legislature to

95.

Act of Nov. 12, 1981, 1981 Ohio Legis. Serv. 5-329, 5-493 (Baldwin) (codified at OHIO

REV. CODE ANN. § 5101.463 (Page Supp. 1982)). As enacted, H. 694 specified the content and

operation of contracts entered into by the state and by title XX providers of social services: Id.
96. See supra text accompanying note 53. The Joint Committee concluded that the agency
had exceeded the scope of the enabling statute in promulgating the rule, and that the proposed
rule was inconsistent with the legislative intent of the enabling statute. Minutes of the Meeting of
the Joint Committee on Agency Rule Review 7 (Aug. 16, 1982) (on file with University of Dayton
Law Review). The general assembly agreed with the recommendation of the committee and invalidated the rule by joint resolution. 1982 Ohio Laws 2587. In tandem with the'invalidating joint
resolution, the general assembly also passed a resolution allowing the agency to revise the rule to
comply with the "intent of the legislature," and to refile the rule. Id. Presumably, this second
resolution was passed in order to avoid the statutory restriction preventing the agency from refiling an invalidated rule until the next session of the general assembly. See supra text accompanying note 54.
97. See supra note 96. The degree to which the legislature may restrict the statutory discretion accorded an agency is further exemplified by the invalidation of two interrelated rules proposed by the Ohio Department of Industrial Relations Board of Building Standards (Board). Proposed Amendments to OHIO ADMIN. CODE §§ 4101:2-14-09, 4101:2-14-10 (1982) [hereinafter
cited as Proposed Amendments] (on file with University of Dayton Law Review). The rules had
been filed pursuant to an enabling statute which authorized the Board to "[f]ormulate and adopt
rules governing the erection, construction, repair, alteration, and maintenance of all buildings."
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3781.10(A) (Page 1978). The statute limited the discretion of the Board
in formulating building standards only by the broad requirement that "[s]uch standards shall
relate to the conservation of energy in and to the safety and sanitation of such building." Id. The
stated purpose of the proposed rules was to "increase fire resistance required between dwelling
units . . . in multi-family residences." Proposed Amendments, supra. To accomplish this purpose,
the rules provided a table specifically setting out and increasing the acceptable standards for the
construction of fire-resistant walls in multi-family dwelling units, and required that the increased
fire-resistance standards be met in any future construction. Proposed Amendments, supra. Taking
into consideration the broad grant of statutory discretion accorded the Board to promulgate rules
promoting safety, it is incongruous to suggest that the Board did not have the statutory authority
to increase fire-resistance requirements. The Joint Committee, however, recommended the two
rules for invalidation for exactly that reason. Minutes of the Meeting of the Joint Committee on
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amend the enabling statute by manipulating the rulemaking process,
arguably subverting the constitutional requirement of submitting all
proposed laws to the governor for a possible veto.9 8
IV.

A

SURVEY OF OTHER STATE SYSTEMS OF LEGISLATIVE REVIEW

An examination of the differing systems of legislative review employed in the states reveals no uniform approach. This diversity of systems provides alternative models of legislative review that may be compared to evaluate the constitutionality of the procedure in Ohio.9"
Eleven states have no comprehensive system by which the legislature may review the promulgation of administrative agency rules.'
These states rely instead upon the traditional power of the legislature
to control agency rulemaking by enacting statutes sufficiently specific
for direct agency application.' 0 '
Twenty-four states have advisory committees which are authorized
to review agency rules and recommend that objectionable rules be invalidated."' Unlike the Ohio system, however, the legislatures of these
states may invalidate a rule only by enacting a specific statute. This
system avoids the constitutional snare of invalidation by joint resolution
without presentment to the executive for a possible veto.' 0 3
Eleven states have legislative review systems similar to that of
Ohio. In these states, an advisory committee makes recommendations
to the legislature, which may invalidate rules by passing a joint resolution.' 04 Such a system has, however, been recently declared unconstitutional in Alaska and West Virginia." 5 In both states, the constitutional
violation was found in the failure of. the legislature to follow formal
lawmaking procedures (including presentment to the executive) in invalidating rules.' 0 6
In three states an advisory committee reviews agency rules and
recommends legislative invalidation of objectionable rules. 107 The legislature can invalidate rules only by enacting a statute. Notwithstanding
a legislative invalidation, however, the objections of the advisory comAgency Rule Review 8 (Oct. 13, 1982) (on file with University of Dayton Law Review).
98. See supra notes 8, 11 and accompanying text.
99. See generally Levinson, Legislative and Executive Veto of Rules of Administrative
Agencies: Models and Alternatives, 24 WM. & MARY L. REV. 79 (1982).
100. Id. at 81 n.10.
101. Id. at 81. See also supra notes 8, 11 and accompanying text.
102. Id. at 81 n.1, 82 n.15.
103. See supra notes 8, 11 and accompanying text.
104. Levinson, supra note 99, at 82 n.13.
105. Id. at 82 n.13. See infra notes 115-19, 130-37 and accompanying text.
106. See infra notes 120-29 and accompanying text.
107. Levinson, supra note 99, at 83 n.16.
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mittee are published with the rule, which becomes effective.10 8 The objections of the advisory committee serve to shift the burden of persuasion to the agency in any subsequent litigation concerning the validity
of the rule. 10 9
No state has to date adopted a constitutional amendment authorizing a system of review and invalidation through joint resolution." 0
Four states have, however, rejected by referendum proposed constitutional amendments which would have authorized such a system." Two
states have adopted constitutional amendments authorizing a legislative
committee to suspend objectionable agency rules pending final legislative action, by statute. "
A.

State Court Decisions

The constitutional issue concerning legislative review that has been
consistently identified and refined is the requirement that the legislature "act" only by statute, and that all laws be "presented" to the executive for a possible Veto before enactment. " 3
Unlike the Ohio and Federal Constitutions,- most of the states
which have addressed-the constitutionality of legislative review have express constitutional provisions calling for the separation of governmental powers into a tripartite system of checks and balances. It is questionable, however, whether such an express requirement for the
separation of powers actually commands a more strict separation than
11
does the inferred separation of powers in the Ohio Constitution .
State courts addressing the constitutionality of legislative review have,
however, viewed an express constitutional separation of powers as a
factor to be considered.
For example, the Supreme Court of West Virginia found legislative review to be a violation of a state constitutional provision calling
for the strict separation of governmental powers.115 The system of review in West Virginia had required that agency rules be approved by a
legislative committee before becoming effective. " 6 The court based its
holding on the theory that by authorizing the invalidation of agency

108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 84 nn.23-24.
Ill. Id. at 84 n.22.
112. Id.
113. See State v. A.L.I.V.E. Voluntary, 606 P.2d 769 (Alaska 1980); Maloney v. Pac, 439
A.2d 349 (Conn. 1981); Opinion of the Justices, 121 N.H. 552, 431 A.2d 783 (1981); General
Assembly v. Byrne, 90 N.J. 376, 448 A.2d 438 (1982).
114. See infra notes 148-56 and accompanying text.
115. Manchin, 279 S.E.2d at 630-31.
at 626.
116. byId.eCommons,
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rules by a legislative committee the legislature had "invest[ed] itself
with the power to promulgate rules having the force and effect of law
outside the constitutional limitations imposed upon the legislative
branch in the exercise of that power."' 7
Extending this reasoning, the West Virginia court found that
under the state constitution the legislature could amend laws only by
following the constitutional lawmaking process, including submission to
the governor for a possible veto. 1" 8 Thus, although the court phrased its
decision in terms of a violation of the expressly required separation of
powers, it based the decision on the legislature's failure to observe the
constitutional requirement of submission of all amending legislation to
the governor for a possible veto." 9
This analysis was further refined by the Supreme Court of New
Jersey. 10 The New Jersey court found unconstitutional a statute authorizing a legislative committee to review agency rules and make recommendations to the legislature for the invalidation of particular
rules.' 2 ' The legislature could then invalidate a recommended rule by
joint resolution."' In content and operation, the New Jersey system
was similar to that of Ohio."13 Unlike the Ohio Constitution, however,
the New Jersey Constitution expressly requires a tripartite separation
of governmental powers.' 2" The New Jersey court relied upon this constitutional requirement to support its decision, but focused its analysis
upon the constitutionally required. procedures for lawmaking." 5
The New Jersey court first focused upon the actual effect of legislative invalidation."16 The court reasoned that because rules promulgated by administrative agencies have the full force and effect of law,
the legislative invalidation of such rules conferred upon the legislature
"the power to exert a policymaking effect equivalent to amending or
repealing existing legislation."" 7 Proceeding upon the premise that the
invalidation of an agency rule is equivalent to .amending the statute
authorizing the agency to act, the New Jersey court read the presentment clause as a limit on this legislative power." 2 8 By not presenting

117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id. at 633.
Id.
Id. at 632.
General Assembly, 90 N.J. 376, 448 A.2d 438 (1982).
Id. at 379-81, 448 A.2d at 439-40.
Id.
See supra text accompanying notes 43-58.
General Assembly, 90 N.J. at 381-85, 448 A.2d at 440-43.
Id. at 388-92, 448 A.2d at 444-47.
Id.
Id. at 388, 448 A.2d at 444.
Id. at 388-92, 448 A.2d at 444-47.
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proposed amending legislation to the governor for a possible veto, the
New Jersey Legislature had encroached upon the constitutional authority of the executive, thus violating the required separation of powers. 1" 9
The Alaska Supreme Court in State v. A.L.LV.E. Voluntary'3 0
shed further light on the appropriateness of invalidating agency rules
by joint resolution rather than by enacting a statute. Alaska had a legislative review system similar to Ohio's, in that agency rules were invalidated by joint resolution upon the recommendation of a legislative review committee.' 3 ' Like the Ohio Constitution, the Alaska Constitution
has no express provision requiring a tripartite separation of governmental powers. The Alaska court apparently found this lack of an'express
constitutional separation of powers to be of little consequence in finding
legislative invalidation through joint resolution unconstitutional.
The court focused upon a provision of the Alaska Constitution expressly requiring the legislature to follow formal lawmaking procedures, specifically settling upon the definition of a joint resolution and
the presentment clause as dispositive of the constitutional issue."3 2
First, the Alaska court determined that the legislature had the power to
act through joint resolution only in an "advisory capacity."' 33 The
court viewed the invalidation of agency rules by joint resolution as
equivalent to amending existing laws.3" Accordingly, for the legislature
"to take action having a binding effect on those outside the legislature," the constitutional procedures for enacting a law should have
been followed." 5
Applying the constitutional lawmaking procedures to the legislative invalidation of agency rules, the Alaska court found that the specific provision requiring presentment to the governor of all proposed
laws had been violated."' Implicit in this analysis is the inference that
legislative review of agency rules is not per se unconstitutional, as it is
the invalidation of agency rules by joint resolution that has consistently
been found to contravene the constitutional lawmaking requirements." 7
In order to apply this analysis, it will be necessary to examine the relationship of the Ohio Constitution to the invalidation of agency rules by
joint resolution.

129. Id.
130. 606 P.2d 769 (Alaska 1980).
131. Id. at 771.
132. Id. at 772-74.
133. Id. at 773.
134. Id. at 774.
135. Id. at 773.
136. Id. at 772-73.
137. See, e.g., Opinion of the Justices, 121 N.H. at 559, 431 A.2d at 787-88.
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SEPARATION OF GOVERNMENTAL POWERS UNDER THE OHIO
CONSTITUTION

The first document governing what was to become the State of
Ohio was the Ordinance for the Government of the United States
Northwest of the River Ohio, adopted in 1787 while the Articles of
Confederation were still in effect." 8" The Ordinance provided for the
establishment of a tripartite system of state government, with the executive and judicial branches responsible for adopting laws from surrounding states as the necessity arose.' 3 9 During this period of state
formation, the legislature retained the power to veto any laws adopted
by the executive or judiciary, or to later amend the adopted laws by
statute. 4 0 Thus, this early government employed a variation of legislative review. Legislative enactments, however, were still subject to the
overriding veto of the governor.""
The Ordinance was replaced by the Constitution of 1802, under
which the governor had no power to veto proposed laws or appoint state
officers-these powers having been delegated to the legislature.'4 The
power of the executive had been restricted due to the popular sentiment
of the time that the former governor had acted in an autocratic manner
by abusing the absolute veto power.""
The next Ohio Constitution, the Constitution of 1851, was also devoid of a provision granting the governor the power of veto.'" This
constitution is still in effect in Ohio, though significantly altered by succeeding amendments. One such amendment, adopted in 1903, once
again conferred upon the governor the power to veto prospective
laws.' 45 This renewed executive veto power was restricted by a provision authorizing the legislature to override the governor's veto by a
two-thirds vote in each house. 46 Additionally limiting the governor's
authority was a time limitation of ten days after presentment, in which

138. See Woodbridge, A History of Separationof Powers in Ohio: A Study in Administrative Law, 13 U. CIN. L. REV. 191, 199 (1939).
139. Id.
140. Id. at 200.
141. Id. The Ordinance required that "'all bills having passed by a majority in the house,
and by a majority in the council, shall be referred to the governor for his assent, but no bills or
legislative act whatsoever, shall be of any force without his assent.'" Id. (quoting 4 JOURNALS OF
CONGRESS 752 (1823)).
142. Woodbridge, supra note 138, at 207-08.
143. Id.at 215-16.
144. Id. at 218.
145. 1902 Ohio Laws 962.
146. This executive veto power was altered by a 1912 amendment which provided that the
legislature could override the governor's veto only by a three-fifths vote in each house, rather than
by the previous requisite two-thirds vote of each house. 1911 Ohio Laws 102.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol9/iss3/11
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time the governor had to veto the bill or it would automatically be
enacted. 4"
The history of the separation of governmental powers in Ohio has
been one of shifting influence between the executive and legislative
branches. The balance has swung upon the necessity of controlling the
power of both branches while allowing the efficient operation of the
state political machinery. In none of the succeeding constitutional revisions has there been a complete and sharp division of the powers of
government. There has never been an express Constitutional requirement of a strict separation of powers beyond the language conferring
individual authority to each respective branch. It is clear, however, that
as it became apparent to the Framers that either the executive or legislative branch was exerting an inordinate amount of political influence,
the balance of power was readjusted to compensate the excess and retain a relative equipoise of governmental power.
A.

The Court's Interpretation

The Ohio Supreme Court has consistently reaffirmed that the
Framers intended the tripartite branches of government to operate independently.1 48 The fact that the governmental powers have been severally distributed by the constitution evidences a purpose that the powers
and duties of each should be separate;1 4 9 the separation of powers is
thus clearly implied in the constitution. 50
The court has recognized, however, that many necessary governmental functions are assumed tangentially to the express power conferred to each branch by the constitution.1 51 "Where a power is quasi
legislative, or quasi administrative, or quasi judicial, or a combination
of all of them, the Legislature may, where such twilight zone of distinc-

147.

Id.

148. See, e.g., Fairview v. Giffee, 73 Ohio St. 183, 76 N.E. 865 (1905); City of Zanesville v.
Zanesville Tel. & Tel. Co., 64 Ohio St. 67, 59 N.E. 781 (1901).
149. State ex rel. Montgomery v. Rogers, 71 Ohio St. 203, 73 N.E. 461 (1905).
[Wihile the constitution of Ohio does not in express terms forbid the conferring of powers
belonging to one branch of the state government on any co-ordinate branch, yet the fact
that these governmental powers have been severally distributed by the constitution to the
legislative, executive and judicial departments of our state government, clearly evidences a
purpose that the powers and duties of each shall be separate from and independent of the
powers and duties of the other co-ordinate branches, and the distribution so made to the
several departments, by clear implication operates as a limitation upon and a prohibition of
the right to confer or impose upon either powers that belong distinctively to one of the
other co-ordinate branches.
Id. at 216-17, 73 N.E. at 462 (citation omitted).
150. Stanton v. State Tax Comm'n, 114 Ohio St. 658, 662, 151 N.E. 760, 762 (1926).
151. Ex parte Bevan, 126 Ohio St. 126, 135, 184 N.E. 393, 396-97, affid sub noma.Bevan
v. Krieger, 289 U.S. 459 (1933).
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tion applies, characterize the power and confer it upon any agency it
selects or creates for the purpose."' 52 The limitation upon this legislative power to delegate governmental authority is that such a delegation
cannot contravene an express constitutional provision delegating the
same authority. 153 The nature of legislatively delegated authority determines whether the legislature has delegated a power properly belonging
to another branch. If the authority delegated constitutes the "whole
power" of another respective branch, the express constitutional delegation of authority has been violated.1 54 This interpretation of the constitution allows the legislature, under the police power, to confer upon
administrative agencies the authority to promulgate rules having the
full force and effect of law. The legislature may not, however, confer
the "whole power" of the legislature to an agency. In each case the
nature of the delegated authority must be examined against the express
constitutional provision delegating similar authority.
If the legislature has conferred upon an agency the power to promulgate rules, but has not provided the agency with "specific guidelines" within which to act, the delegation is unconstitutional because
the whole power of the legislature has been conferred. 55 It is constitutionally required that the statute authorizing an agency to promulgate
rules be sufficiently specific to allow the agency to act subordinate to
the enabling statute, rather than with blanket authority. 15 6
By conferring upon itself the statutory authority to review and invalidate agency rules, the legislature has restricted the quasi-legislative
discretion of agencies by a means outside of the enabling statute. By
reviewing agency rules, the legislature has placed an external limitation
on agency discretion beyond the requirement that the enabling statute
contain "specific guidelines" for agency application. By invalidating
agency rules through joint resolution, the legislature has conferred
upon itself the authority to modify agency rules having the full force
and effect of law-without observing the express lawmaking procedures
contained in the constitutional grant of authority to the legislature.
To facilitate constitutional analysis, the process of legislative-review in Ohio must be separated into its component functions. The
power of the Joint Committee to exert a direct influence upon agency
rulemaking decisions is in itself a legislative function. Although this

152. Bogen v. Clemmer, 125 Ohio St. 186, 189, 180 N.E. 710, 711 (1932) (citations
omitted).
153. Lehman v. McBride, 15 Ohio St. 573, 592 (1863).
154. Stanton, 114 Ohio St. at 664, 151 N.E. at 762.
155. Belden v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 143 Ohio St. 329, 342, 55 N.E.2d 629, 635,
appeal dismissed, 323 U.S. 674 (1944).
156. Id.
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power is dependent upon the willingness of the legislature to accept
Joint Committee recommendations for invalidation, it is a political process distinct from the legislative invalidation through joint resolution.
The legislative power to invalidate agency rules by joint resolution
is the exercise of an express delegation of constitutional power. The
authority of a legislative committee to exert political influence over an
agency by overseeing the promulgation of rules is an exercise of the
"police power" implied in the delegation of constitutional power to the
legislature. The actual legislative invalidation of agency rules simply
adds credibility to the political influence wielded by the Joint Committee. The constitutional distinction lies in the presumption of constitutionality accorded the legislature when acting under the implied police
power, as opposed to the authority of the legislature to modify an express delegation of constitutional power.
B.

The Constitutional Distinction

In an early case attempting to define the constitutional power of
legislative branch
the legislature, the Ohio Supreme Court extolled the
"as the most important attribute of government.' ' 157 The court viewed
the constitutional purpose of legislative power as the right to control
15 8 The
existing laws by amendment and repeal, or to enact new laws.
exercise of this power was restricted, however, to situations in which
the "public safety, the public interest, or public convenience shall demand it."' 59
Since the legislature is constitutionally empowered to advance the
public welfare, a statute enacted under this "police power" is presumed
to be constitutional.1 6 In upholding the legislature's constitutional authority to enact such a statute, the supreme court has in the past categorized legislative power as "general" rather than "special"-so that
any restriction upon this broad power must be clearly expressed in the
constitution. 6 ' The court has found that the only restriction upon the
power of the legislature to enact a statute under the police power is an
express or implied constitutional provision limiting the legislature's
power to act. 16 2 The Ohio Constitution does not expressly limit the exercise of legislative power. It is a document conferring governmental

157. Bank of Toledo v. City of Toledo, I Ohio St. 622, 688 (1853).
158. Id.
159. Id. at 686.
160. Lehman, 15 Ohio St. 573 (1863) (court upheld the constitutionality of a statute which
allowed persons engaged in out-of-state military service to vote by means of an absentee ballot).
161. Id.at 591-92.
Id.eCommons,
at 592.
162. by
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power, rather than limiting it, as does the Federal Constitution.' 63
Thus, a statute enacted under the police power is presumed to be constitutional unless its enactment encroaches upon the express constitutional authority delegated to another branch of government.1 4
There is no express provision in the Ohio Constitution granting
administrative agencies the authority to promulgate rules. Theirs is a
power delegated by the legislature under the broad police power, and is
hence presumed constitutional. The invalidation of agency rules by
joint resolution, however, is a modification of the express power delegated to the legislature in article II of the Ohio Constitution.
Article II expressly delegates to the legislature the constitutional
authority to enact laws, 6 5 and sets forth the procedure for enactment.' 66 This formal procedure includes a requirement that all proposed laws be presented to the governor for a possible veto.' 6 Additionally, article II, as construed by the courts, limits the power of the
legislature to act by joint resolution. 68 A joint resolution may be employed only in an advisory function. 69 In effect, its operation is confined to the internal operation of the legislature, as in actions taken to
discipline members of the assembly.17 0
As article II is an express constitutional delegation of authority, it
may not be modified by statute. By conferring upon itself the authority
to invalidate agency rules by joint resolution, the legislature has arguably empowered itself, by statute, to act in a manner inconsistent with
the language and purpose of article II.
C. The Authority of the Legislature to Review Agency Rules under
the Police Power
Because the Ohio Constitution has no express provision requiring a
strict separation of governmental powers, the Ohio Supreme Court has
construed statutes delegating quasi-legislative power to other branches
of government as entitled to a presumption of constitutionality under

163. State ex rel. Jackman v. Court of Common Pleas, 9 Ohio St. 2d 159, 162, 224 N.E.2d
906, 909 (1967).
164. Id.
165. OHIo CONST. art. II, § 1.
166. Id. art. 11, § 15.
167. Id. art. 1I, § 16.
168. Id. art. I1,§ 15(F).
169. Cleveland Terminal & Valley R.R. v. State, 85 Ohio St. 251, 281, 97 N.E. 967, 973
(1912).
170. Id. See also OHIO CONST. art. II, § 6 (delegating to each house of the general assembly the authority to provide internal discipline in order to maintain the "undisturbed transaction
of its business"). The passage of a joint resolution provides the means for internal discipline. See
supra note 169 and accompanying text.
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the police power. 17 ' The court has allowed such a grant of quasi-legislative power due to the necessity of allowing the coequal branches of government to function efficiently.17 2 This public necessity brings the delegation under the broadly conferred police power. With respect to the
quasi-legislative discretion which the legislature may constitutionally
confer upon an administrative agency, the only constitutional restriction is the traditional constitutional limitation upon the police
power-an express constitutional delegation of the authority conferred
by statute.
Since the legislature has under the police power the constitutional
authority to confer quasi-legislative power upon an agency, it likewise
has the power to restrict or modify that grant of power. Thus, legislative review of agency rules is constitutional because there is no express
constitutional delegation of quasi-legislative authority to the executive
branch.
The only limitation upon the legislature's police power in this regard is that it pass statutes with "specific guidelines" for agency application, thus preventing the agency from exercising the whole power of
the legislature. Clearly, the authority to oversee the promulgation of
agency rules is within the "specific guidelines" requirement.173 Legislative review of agency rulemaking is no more than the implementation
of the specific guidelines constitutionally required when the legislature
confers quasi-legislative authority upon the agency.
D. The Constitutional Restriction upon the Authority of the Legislature to Invalidate Agency Rules
The legislative invalidation of an agency rule, however, falls into
the constitutional restriction placed upon the police power because, in
its own constitutional authority
so acting, the legislature must modify
4
II.17
article
under
to enact statutes
Rules promulgated by an administrative agency have the full force
and effect of law.' 75 If the enabling statute is sufficiently specific to
guide agency rulemaking, the rules promulgated by an agency are
viewed as subordinate laws. In promulgating such rules the agency is in
effect constitutionally exercising legislative power. Thus, the invalidation of an agency rule is tantamount to amending the specific details of
the enabling statute that have been promulgated under the quasi-legislative power of the agency. This unconstitutional encroachment upon
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the quasi-legislative discretion of the agency is made explicit by the
presentment clause of article II, and by the definition of joint resolution
supplied by the Ohio courts and implied under article II. The presentment clause requires the legislature to defer to an overriding veto of the
governor. Although the governor's power of veto is not absolute, it cannot be modified by statute because it is an express constitutional delegation of authority. Since the invalidation of an agency rule is tantamount to amending an existing statute by joint resolution, the
presentment clause has been violated.
The article II definition of a joint resolution as it has been interpreted by the judiciary further illustrates the violation of the presentment requirement. Under article II, a joint resolution may be passed
upon the concurrence of each house. Presentment to the governor for a
possible veto is not required. But the Ohio Supreme Court has interpreted article II as requiring that a joint resolution be passed by the
legislature only in an advisory capacity, or as a means of internal discipline. 17 1 Existing statutes can neither be repealed nor amended by joint
resolution; the legislature has no power to act by joint resolution.
Because agency rules have the full force and effect of law, the
invalidation of a rule necessarily has an effect on the public beyond
that of a joint resolution under article II. Reading the strict limitation
on the allowable scope of a joint resolution together with the presentment requirement, it is clear that the presentment requirement applies
to all legislative acts having a wide-ranging impact on the public. By
definition, a joint resolution can be utilized only to make known a legislative opinion or to efficiently manage the internal functioning of the
legislature. There is no constitutional medium provided for the invalidation of agency rules. While a joint resolution invalidation is not the
enactment of amending law, it surely cannot be viewed as having the
limited public effect of a joint resolution under article II.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Our system of constitutional democracy was not undertaken because it is the most efficient of all political systems. At both state and
federal levels, the tripartite governmental branches are empowered and
restrained by one document. An affirmative constitutional delegation of
power, such as the power to legislate, is conditioned upon a strict observance of the constitutional procedures by which such power may be
utilized, and restrained by an affirmative delegation of countervailing
power to a coordinate branch.
The essential tension between governmental branches provided by
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a written constitution often results in conflict among the branches over
power that is not expressly delegated. It falls upon the judicial branch
to resolve such internal disputes in gray areas of constitutional authority. The language and history of the Ohio Constitution suggest that by
invalidating rules which have a widespread effect on the public, the
Ohio General Assembly has overstepped the constitutional bounds of
its authority. For the legislature to "act" without observing the constitutional procedure controlling the legislative exercise of power, including submission to the overriding power of the executive, seems to violate both the language the purpose of the Ohio Constitution. Concerns
voiced by the Supreme Court in Chadha in respect of the Federal Constitution stand as an equally potent reminder in the Ohio context as
well:
The bicameral requirement, the Presentment Clauses, the President's
veto, and Congress' power to override a veto were intended to erect enduring checks on each Branch and to protect the people from the improvident exercise of power by mandating certain prescribed steps. To
preserve those checks, and maintain the separation of powers, the carefully defined limits on the power of each Branch must not be eroded.1 7
A final resolution of this constitutional conflict in Ohio will have to
await yet another judicial decision, however.

James Bradford Gainer
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